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Abstract 
 
Devolution and the associated mechanisms of governance - a power-sharing Executive, 
elected Assembly, cross-border bodies, a reformed system of public administration and civic 
engagement, are part of the wider mosaic of peace building. Their implementation is an 
attempt to institutionalise stability and copper-fasten a political settlement. This paper outlines 
the changing governmental arrangements obtaining within Northern Ireland, as it has shifted 
tentatively away from Direct Rule. It maps the wider public sector in Northern Ireland, 
including civil administration (chiefly the Northern Ireland Civil Service), an extended mosaic 
of non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) and other public agencies that, together with 
local government, form a complex multi-layered sub-regional governance. Our contention is 
that the manner in which the administration of Northern Ireland has been conducted yields 
fruitful insights into issues of territorial management in other areas afflicted by intractable 
constitutional wrangles and attendant violence. In short, an agreed system of governance is 
integral to the transition from conflict to peace (or at least stability) and, in the case of 
Northern Ireland, was central to the substance of the Belfast Agreement, characterised by a 
power-sharing Executive. 
 
Introduction 
 
Few places in the western world have attracted the level of intense political, media and 
academic scrutiny as has been lavished on Northern Ireland, so synonymous is it with political 
violence and terrorism. Inevitably, the spotlight has gravitated towards more immediate 
symptoms of its inter-communal ethno-national strife and, of late, the tortuous trail of 
acrimonious negotiations in the ‘peace process’. Consequently, the routine business of 
government has received rather less attention, notwithstanding some notable exceptions
1
. 
However, there are fundamental aspects of the way in which Northern Ireland has been 
governed and its wider system of public administration that do merit inspection. 
 
When Ireland was partitioned in 1920, Northern Ireland remained an integral part of the UK. 
Broadly ever since, it has been governed in accordance with British administrative precepts, 
although considerable differences have co-existed reflecting prevailing local conditions. 
Largely, any divergence from established norms in the UK reflects how the Province is ‘a 
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place apart’ and ‘special case’ wherein the British state ‘governs without consensus’2. 
Northern Ireland was never envisaged as a shared political construct or as Northern Ireland's 
first Prime Minister, James Craig, put it "all I boast is that we are a Protestant Parliament and 
a Protestant state"
3
. To secure this, from its foundation in 1921 until the suspension of 
Stormont in 1972, the Ulster Unionists formed the Government of Northern Ireland and made 
n attempt to share power with Catholics. In turn, Catholics deepened the antagonism of 
Unionists by refusing to recognise the legitimacy of the Stormont regime, which led to an 
indifferent minority population, and the determination of the majority to monopolise power
4
. 
Birch put this more succinctly: "For fifty years Northern Ireland had a political system in 
which a permanent majority nursed their power and a permanent minority nursed their 
grievances"
5
.   
 
Geographically separate and politically distinct from Great Britain, Northern Ireland’s semi-
detached character is reinforced by its proximity to the Republic of Ireland with which it 
enjoys a contentious relationship, especially following the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) and 
subsequent role for Irish civil servants in mediating Northern Ireland’s affairs. Idiosyncratic 
though these various administrative arrangements can be, they have functioned satisfactorily 
albeit problematically and controversially.  Indeed, the relative stability and continuity in the 
administration of key public services undoubtedly helped fashion some semblance of 
normality for the besieged population. 
 
Thus, this paper does two things. It outlines the changing governmental arrangements 
obtaining within Northern Ireland, as it has shifted tentatively away from Direct Rule. In 
particular, it focuses on the institutional novelties of the devolved settlement that was 
established for Northern Ireland’s internal affairs as part of the Good Friday (Belfast) 
Agreement in 1998, as well as those of a cross-border (North-South) and pan-British Isles 
(East-West) nature, which together have been styled ‘devolution-plus’6. It maps the wider 
public sector in Northern Ireland, including civil administration (chiefly the Northern Ireland 
Civil Service), an extended mosaic of non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) and other 
public agencies that, together with local government, form a complex multi-layered sub-
regional governance. This analysis also includes consideration of the changing nature of 
governance involving the development of partnership arrangements, which have received an 
important boost as a result of the emerging European dimension of governance. Our 
  4 
contention is that the manner in which the administration of Northern Ireland has been 
conducted yields fruitful insights into issues of territorial management in other areas afflicted 
by intractable constitutional wrangles and attendant violence. In short, an agreed system of 
governance is integral to the transition from conflict to peace (or at least stability) and, in the 
case of Northern Ireland, was central to the substance of the Belfast Agreement, characterised 
by a power-sharing Executive. 
 
Political Developments from Direct Rule to Devolution 
 
Governing without Consensus 
Unionist dominance in Northern Ireland during the period 1921-1972 resulted in what Whyte 
described as a "consistent and irrefutable pattern of deliberate discrimination against 
Catholics" in electoral practices, public employment, policing, public employment, public 
housing and regional policy, respectively
7
. These grievances led to the emergence of the Civil 
Rights movement which sought to redress discrimination through public protest in the form of 
demonstrations and marches. In 1968 one such march in (London)Derry protested that the 
majority Catholic city was gerrymandered in such a way as to be run by Protestants. The 
march met with a violent reaction from the police and Protestant mobs. In response the 
Unionist Prime Minister, Terence O'Neill, announced a programme of reform - a points 
system for housing allocations, an Ombudsman, the repeal of Special Powers Act (legislation 
passed in 1992 to deal with illegal political activities), 'one man, one vote' (sic) for local 
elections, and an independent housing executive. 
 
The reforms enraged Protestants without appeasing Catholics and although inter-communal 
violence quelled in the short-term, disunity amongst the Unionists began to emerge. Prime 
Minister O'Neill resigned in 1969 suffering a loss in support from the Unionist rank-and-file 
and his parliamentary party for conciliatory overtones to Nationalists. Militant 
Nationalists/Republicans and Loyalist terror groups then engaged in campaigns of violence. 
This led to the British Government to authorise the deployment of units of the armed forces in 
support of the civil power. Several political and military blunders followed, from internment 
without trial through 'political status' for IRA prisoners, to the shooting of 13 demonstrators at 
an anti-internment march in (London)Derry (Bloody Sunday - 30
th
 January 1972). In March 
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1972, with inter-communal violence and terrorist action continuing, the British Government 
suspended the regional parliament at Stormont and introduced Direct Rule from Westminster
8
. 
 
 After the former Stormont arrangements were prorogued and Direct Rule from London was 
imposed in 1972, successive British Governments sought to restore a form of devolved 
power-sharing administration that commanded widespread cross-community acceptance. 
However, save for the ill-fated ‘Sunningdale’ experiment of 1973-1974, the temporary 
expedient of Direct Rule endured, whereby the Secretary of State (a UK Cabinet minister) and 
up to four Ministers of State, exercised direction and control over the Northern Ireland Office 
(NIO) and the central government departments of Northern Ireland. Much of the paraphernalia 
of Stormont remained in situ
9. The “change to direct rule was accomplished without any 
interruption in the day to day business of government”10 and “all that was left was the ritual of 
an orderly and responsible take over”11. 
 
A ‘democratic deficit’ arose because neither the Secretary of State nor his/her team junior 
ministerial team represented a Parliamentary constituency in Northern Ireland. Ministers had 
“a non-elective relationship with the recipients of policy”12. Northern Ireland legislation was 
dealt with through Parliamentary Statutory Instruments rather than full Bills at Westminster. 
Accountability, already tenuous, was undermined further by the fact that no select committee 
existed for Northern Ireland business (unlike for that of the Scottish and Welsh Offices). Only 
in 1993, as part of a ‘deal’ to ensure the continuing support of Ulster Unionist Party MPs for 
John Major’s embattled Conservative Government was a Northern Ireland Affairs Committee 
established. The early performances of Northern Ireland Civil Service officials before 
Parliamentary scrutiny quickly exposed their relative inexperience of dealing with politicians’ 
oversight
13
. 
 
While the immediate circumstances were rather different to those obtaining in Great Britain, 
Northern Ireland’s experience of both devolution (under Stormont) and Direct Rule was 
considered in what Connolly and Loughlin termed an ‘adoption or adaptation’ continuum14. 
They argued that as Northern Ireland is an integral part of the United Kingdom, the policy 
agenda is determined, in part at least, by the concerns of that wider polity. On the other hand, 
given the unique political environment, regional networks exist which adapt Whitehall 
policies to suit the circumstances of Northern Ireland. Thus, since policy uniformity with 
  6 
administrative diversity has long been the norm with the British ‘union state’ tradition, 
Northern Ireland’s political masters (be they the old Unionist Party or London-based 
ministers) basically followed Westminster and Whitehall, albeit tailoring their policy 
prescriptions to suit local conditions, thereby securing ‘parity with particularity’. However, as 
Gaffikin and Morrissey noted, the concept of ‘adoption’ assumed the application of uniform 
policies through the UK even though that was often not the case
15
. Instead, they spoke of 
adaptation within a standard framework of theories, policies and structures. Loughlin went 
further, contending that policy making in Northern Ireland could be viewed as “a continuum 
going from a high degree of convergence to a high degree of divergence” from UK practice16. 
Ultimately, of course, for Direct Rule ministers, ensuring the ‘good government’ of Northern 
Ireland amounted to ‘holding the line’, pending a resolution of the ‘troubles’. 
 
The ‘Peace Process’ 
 
Since the inception of Direct Rule in 1972, the stated aim of successive UK administrations 
was to seek peace, stability and prosperity for the people of Northern Ireland, within a 
framework of harmonious relations with the rest of the United Kingdom, the Republic of 
Ireland and the European Union. A senior Northern Ireland Office official described this 
approach as follows: 
 Promoting agreement among all people who live on the island of Ireland working with 
the Irish Government to that end; 
 A co-operative and coherent approach to all aspects of government policy in Northern 
Ireland which recognises that the fundamental political, security, economic and social 
problems are closely interrelated; and, 
 Policies informed by the principles of equality of opportunity, equity of treatment and 
parity of esteem, irrespective of political, cultural or religious affiliation of gender
17
. 
 
What is important about this approach is the recognition that addressing political problems at 
the macro level is, in itself, insufficient. The role of the state in coping with political violence 
was changing from an exclusive military response to a form of containment/rapprochement 
which recognised the inextricable links between security issues and other political, economic 
and social matters. In other words, even if progress could be made on political, constitutional 
and security issues, the underlying community divisions will still exist and need to be 
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addressed. Any progress at the political level therefore needed to be consolidated by 
government initiatives to bring about equality, promote reconciliation and mutual respect for 
separate cultures and traditions - in short, to create a community which accommodates 
people's aspirations and traditions. This has been referred to as the 'hearts and minds' strategy, 
central to which are policies aimed at improving community relations and providing equality 
of opportunity and equity of treatment. Specifically, the Northern Ireland Office saw this as a 
means of 'wooing' non-Republican Catholics, supporting moderate Nationalist politics in the 
form of the SDLP, and stemming the rising electoral endorsement of Sinn Féin. 
 
Although failure appeared to be the one constant, the search for a political settlement 
produced several attempts by successive governments. The path towards achieving peace, 
stability and prosperity was littered with false dawns, acrimonious exchanges, and mistrust, 
punctuated regularly by continuing terrorist outrages on both sides. The role played by the 
British state as a neutral broker is highly contested in their quest to achieve a political 
settlement. In fact, far from an independent arbiter, the British Government has been accused 
of being a protagonist in the conflict. Ní Aoláin's research into 350 deaths caused by agents of 
the state between 1969-94 illustrates this, as does Rolston's work in which 'collusion' and state 
violence are seen as barriers to political development
18
. 
 
It was not until 1982 that the Northern Ireland Secretary of State proposed ‘rolling devolution’ 
under which an elected Northern Ireland Assembly would gradually assume executive powers 
in proportion to politicians willingness to share responsibility
19
. Although all parties fought 
the elections to the Assembly, the Nationalists (SDLP and Sinn Fein) boycotted it in protest 
against any initiative that sought only internal solutions (that is, excluding Dublin) to Northern 
Ireland’s problems and Unionists’ willingness to work only on quasi-majoritarian terms. With 
no acceptable proposals for devolved structures emerging from the Assembly and electoral 
support for Sinn Fein increasing at the expense of the SDLP, the British and Irish 
Governments signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985.  
 
Reflecting on the period preceding the Anglo-Irish Agreement, O’Day commented: 
Violence was endemic but had receded from the levels of the mid-1970s …. British 
governments increasingly sought to manage the crisis through bilateral diplomacy with 
the Dublin regime … While the strategy paid dividends in terms of Anglo-Irish 
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relations, it did not end terrorism and it exacerbated concerns with the unionist 
community
20
. 
The significant reduction in violence during this period has been as a result of a number of 
factors according to O'Duffy. As the security forces improved their intelligence gathering and 
assumed greater powers to tackle terrorism, the IRA moved to a more covert cell-structure to 
improve its effectiveness. As a direct consequence, the security forces adopted quasi-legal or 
illegal operations ('shoot-to-kill' tactics, collusion with loyalist paramilitaries, forced 
interrogations and the use of 'supergrasses') to tackle terrorism. At the same time the 
Republican movement developed its political machinery following the community support 
engendered by the hunger-strike protest in the early 1980s. According to O'Duffy, security 
policy during this period was dictated by three main considerations: reducing violence to 
'acceptable' levels; appeasing Unionists demands to defeat the IRA; and marginalising 
paramilitaries in an effort to bolster political progress between constitutional parties
21
. 
 
Unionists were incensed that the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement had been negotiated without 
consulting the Unionist majority, formally incorporated an ‘Irish dimension’, and had the 
status of international law. The two main Unionist parties (UUP and DUP) engaged in a 
campaign of political disruption and demonstrations that failed to rescind the Agreement, and 
their relationship with government ministers plummeted to an all-time low. Morrow argued 
that the Anglo-Irish Agreement also created difficulties for Sinn Féin by bolstering the SDLP 
and constitutional Nationalism
22. The political momentum generated by Sinn Féin from the 
hunger strikes had evaporated and led Republicans to rethink their political and military 
options. This new thinking was captured by their emerging conviction that the conflict in 
Northern Ireland could not be resolved by military means alone - one which would transform 
their approach from a policy of 'Brits Out' to endorsing the principle of consent. 
 
Thereafter, commentators disagree over the precise time at which a/the  ‘peace process’ can be 
dated with confidence (to say nothing of the reasons of its emergence), although revulsion at 
the Remembrance Day bombing in Enniskillen in 1987 appeared to foster a climate of 
accommodation, hitherto largely lacking, among some key politicians. Certainly, the results of 
the local government elections in 1989 marked a turning point in local government bringing a 
degree of moderation (always a relative term in Ulster) not unrelated to the decline in 
representation from the political extremes. Inter-party political talks commenced in March 
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1991, to find a means by which substantial powers and responsibilities might be returned to 
locally elected representatives. Although these became mired in procedural and substantive 
wrangling, breaking down in November 1992, they set down tentative parameters within 
which any future moves to a settlement would need to be located. 
 
Desperate to prevent a dangerous vacuum from emerging, and reflecting the political will of 
the then British Prime Minister (John Major) and Irish Taoiseach (Albert Reynolds), the two 
governments seized the initiative by issuing a joint communiqué, the Downing Street (Joint) 
Declaration (December 1993). In making explicit what was already widely assumed, the 
British government’s announcement that it has “no selfish strategic or economic interest in 
Northern Ireland” represented a powerful public statement designed to neutralize charges that 
it was engaged in colonial repression when, in truth, what was afoot amounted to a 
“psychological withdrawal from Ireland prefiguring political and military disengagement”23.  
That such beliefs still lingered in some Republican circles appeared altogether misplaced in a 
post-war Cold War global environment.  
 
The Joint Declaration, set alongside a flurry of secret discussions that included an unpublished 
peace plan devised by the SDLP and Sinn Fein, acted as a catalyst for the first IRA cease-fire 
on 31 August 1994. This was subsequently followed (14 October 1994) by a reciprocal 
cessation of violence from the combined Loyalist Military Command, an umbrella group 
comprising the Ulster Volunteer Force, the Ulster Defence Association and the Red Hand 
Commandos. The IRA announcement claimed its cessation was in recognition of the 
‘potential of the current situation and in order to enhance the democratic peace process’.  The 
Loyalists, in turn, stated that their cease-fire was ‘completely dependent upon the continued 
IRA cessation, since the Republican cease-fire has yet to be declared permanent’.  
 
The two Governments published ‘Frameworks for the Future’ (‘the Frameworks Documents) 
in February 1995. Partly through choreography, partly by individual protagonists ‘testing the 
water’ through unilateral gestures, the peace process inched forward until the momentum 
stalled in February 1996 when the IRA ended its cease-fire in dramatic tragic fashion, before 
being regenerated in May 1997 following Labour’s landslide General Election victory. 
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Anxious to avoid a repetition of earlier talks in which discussion of substantive issues 
frequently fell victim to procedural foot-dragging, the Government set a firm timetable for the 
new round of talks. Nonetheless, while the details were debated ad nauseum, the broad outline 
was clear, being based on the notion of ‘Three Strands’ (Internal, North-South, East-West) 
plus steps to ensure phased ‘normalisation’ through policing reform, weapons 
decommissioning, relaxation of security policy, prisoner releases, and an ‘equality agenda’ 
placed on a statutory footing. The subsequent agreement reached on Good Friday (April 1998) 
was ratified in a referendum on 22 May 1998. “Ostensibly a democratic device, referendums 
allow for blunt majoritarianism and have a disastrous record in attempting to ‘resolve’ 
complex ethno national conflicts around the world”24. Thus, the referendum question was 
devised in such a way as to minimise the dangers of majoritarianism by garnering cross-
community support as distinct from the last plebiscite (the Border Poll of 1973), while being 
simultaneously replicated in the Irish Republic (though not Great Britain). On an 
exceptionally high turnout of 951,845 (80.9%), the ‘Yes’ vote was 676,966 (71.12%), with the 
‘No’ vote being 274,879 (28.88%). On 25 June 1998, elections to the new Northern Ireland 
Assembly were held. 
 
New Institutional Arrangements 
The Good Friday Agreement was designed to bring peace to the divided society of Northern 
Ireland and mark a new dimension in the way it was governed. In the sixth year of the post-
agreement era, however, important institutions have been suspended and aspects of the 
process appear to have relapsed. Early optimism has evaporated as promises have gone 
unfulfilled. Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future, the Agreement remains the only realistic 
alternative to continued Direct Rule. Even if substantially revised, the core principles 
(revolving around the Three Strands and the consent principle) seem set to remain central to 
any reformulated or renegotiated version that may arise following elections. 
 
The Belfast Agreement involved a radical departure from the devolution in existence from 
1921-72. No longer would Northern Ireland be “hermetically sealed from outside influence”25. 
Direct Rule had signalled an irrevocable shift in its governance for, while not proving the 
temporary expedient hoped for by London, it was clear that restoring the status quo ante of a 
majoritarian Stormont was no longer a credible alternative. Thus, although the Belfast 
Agreement affirmed that Northern Ireland should remain within the United Kingdom so long 
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as that was the wish of the people living there, both governments would give effect to 
arrangements for a ‘United’ Ireland if that should become the wish of the people of Northern 
Ireland. The Irish government undertook to amend its 1937 Constitution (Articles 2 and 3) to 
reflect this principle of consent, while the British government agreed to introduce legislation 
to do likewise. 
 
Specifically, the Belfast Agreement created new devolved democratic institutions. There is a 
108-strong Assembly elected by the single transferable vote (STV) form of proportional 
representation. The number of seats was a product of pre-Agreement negotiations during 
which concerns were expressed that if the demands of the smaller Loyalist parties (PUP/UDP) 
were not met, their cease fires would not be sustained. Hence, early discussions about having 
5-member parliamentary (Westminster) constituency elections (giving a 90 person Assembly) 
moved to agreeing 6 members per constituency, resulting in 108 seats in the new Assembly. 
This contrasts with a 129 member Scottish Parliament which has three times the population of 
Northern Ireland and broadly similar powers. As Wilford and Wilson point out, the 
combination of using the STV electoral system and efforts to ensure Loyalist representation in 
the Assembly provided a disincentive for extremist electoral behaviour
26
.  On the other hand, 
the expressed intent of the Agreement is to provide a democratically elected Assembly in 
Northern Ireland which "is inclusive in its membership".  
 
From the Assembly, a First Minister, Deputy First Minister and 10 (later 12) other members 
were appointed to form the Northern Ireland Executive. Together, both institutions constituted 
a power-sharing arrangement in the classic consociational mould albeit with novel features 
designed (depending upon one’s political perspective) to ensure certain outcomes did (or did 
not) eventuate, involving weighted majorities and cross-community support. While not being 
a formal ‘grand coalition’, the Executive was tantamount to a permanent ‘rainbow coalition 
government’ drawn from the Assembly using the d’Hondt method. The positions of the First 
and Deputy First Ministers are inextricably linked. The Agreement required there to be a 
committee for each of the main executive functions of the Northern Ireland administration. 
The number of government departments was part of the negotiations mainly between the UUP 
and the SDLP during late 1998. Concurrently, Northern Ireland’s government departments 
were reconfigured from 6 to 10 (see Table 1), as well as a new Office of the First Minister and 
Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM). The Northern Ireland Office remained in situ to deal with 
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those matters reserved (policing, prisons, security and criminal justice) as well as in the event 
of a suspension. 
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Table 1: Central Government Department Structure Under Direct Rule and Devolution 
 
Old Structure New Structure 
NIO Central Secretariat NIO Central Secretariat 
 Office of First Minister and Deputy First Minister 
Agriculture Agriculture and Rural Development 
Economic Development Culture, Arts and Leisure 
Education Education 
Environment Enterprise, Trade and Investment 
Finance and Personnel Environment 
Health and Social Services Finance and Personnel 
 Health and Social Services and Public Safety 
 Higher and Further Education, Training and 
Employment (subsequently retitled ‘Employment 
and Learning’) 
 Regional Development 
 Social Development 
 
 
Under devolution, ministers have full executive authority in their respective areas of 
responsibility, a travesty of democracy according to the Agreement’s implacable opponents 
such as Ian Paisley’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) when faced with Sinn Fein ministers 
holding portfolios in health and education. There are checks on ministerial autonomy but they 
appear weak; in theory, the Assembly could sack a minister though that seems inconceivable 
given the Assembly arithmetic. Additionally, a powerful committee flanks each department, 
being "charged to ‘advise and assist’ each of the departments with which they are associated 
‘in the formulation of policy’; in addition, they may initiate primary legislation"27. 
 
In addition, the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 and its associated secretariat were abolished. 
The Agreement signalled the creation of a new North-South Ministerial Council (and other 
all-Ireland Implementation Bodies) established under a new British-Irish agreement, and a 
British-Irish Council (‘Council of the Isles’) and a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference 
(see Table 2). 
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Table 2: North-South Institutions 
 
Implementation Bodies Areas of Co-operation 
Inland Waterways Agriculture 
Food Safety Education 
Trade and Business Development Environment 
Special EU Programmes Health 
Language (Irish and Ulster Scots) Transport 
Aquaculture and Marine Matters Tourism 
 
 
Any analysis of the situation in Northern Ireland must take into consideration that the political 
reality of the Province is shaped not only by the British government but also by reference to 
the Irish Government. The desire of ‘integrationists’ that Northern Ireland was ‘as British as 
Finchley’ and thus should be fully integrated into the UK - always highly unlikely even under 
the avowedly ‘Unionist’ Thatcher governments – has looked increasingly untenable since 
1997 and Labour’s constitutional reforms in Great Britain. At the same time, however, its 
position has never been directly comparable to that of Scotland and Wales. The Agreement’s 
quasi-federal tendencies and its provisional nature, as distinct from finality (namely, the 
prospect of rolling referendums on the question of an irreversible secession from the UK and 
(re-) union with southern Ireland), confers upon Northern Ireland a greater autonomy than has 
been accorded to any other part of the UK
28
. 
 
Beyond the ‘first order’ institutions, the Belfast Agreement involves a twin track approach. 
One element includes a review of public administration arrangements in Northern Ireland 
incorporating local government, quangos and agencies (but importantly not the 11 government 
departments). The second element has three aims: firstly, to develop more formal 
arrangements with the voluntary and community sector in the decision making processes of 
government departments; secondly, the institutionalisation of social partnership through the 
Civic Forum, established under the Belfast Agreement; and finally, the emergence of local 
partnership arrangements in a number of important functional areas (health, community safety 
and ‘well-being’)29.  
 
Taken as a whole, the institutional arrangements fashioned by the Belfast Agreement have 
attracted considerable comment. The new governmental architecture of the British Isles entails 
a series of institutional connections that represents an interesting species of federalism. Thus, 
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the exclusivist demands of traditional Ulster unionism or Irish nationalism are oddly out of 
place in what Elazar contended was an emerging new paradigm. According to Elazar, nation 
states will not disappear but  
will be overlaid by a variety of federal arrangements of a confederal character … in a 
network of agreements that are not only militarily and economically binding for de 
facto reasons but are also becoming constitutionally binding, de jure. This overlay 
increasingly reflects what was called state sovereignty, and forces states into various 
combinations of self-rule and shared rule to enable them to survive at all. That means 
federalism, understood in the broadest sense as a genus involving combinations of 
self-rule and shared rule rather than as the one species of federalism accepted in 
modern times – federation30. 
Together, therefore, the 3 strands of the Belfast Agreement amount, according to O’Leary, to 
an internal consociation built within overarching confederal and federal institutions;  
it has imaginative elements of co-sovereignty; it promises a novel model of ‘double 
protection’; and it rests on a bargain derived from diametrically conflicting hopes 
about its likely long-run outcome, but that may not destabilize it
31
. 
Certainly, in administrative terms, Northern Ireland is the living embodiment of ‘variable 
geometry’, confirming Rhodes’ contention that the UK possesses a ‘differentiated polity’32. 
Throughout its history, the governance of Northern Ireland (both internally, and in respect of 
its place within the UK) has exhibited profound differences with Great Britain (itself a far 
from homogenous entity). To that end, just as Direct Rule in no way implied that Northern 
Ireland was governed like the rest of the UK (for nowhere in Great Britain would reference be 
made to ‘Direct Rule’), so devolution simply underscores the sense of difference. Indeed, the 
pattern of the UK’s territorial management has become increasingly variegated as a 
consequence of devolution in Great Britain, too. The Belfast Agreement was fortuitously 
timed since it “enabled the Blair government to tie Northern Ireland into its wider 
constitutional reform project”33. If the provisions of the Belfast Agreement are permitted to 
make themselves felt, the differentiation of UK governance will be entrenched further still 
(see Table 3). As the imposition of Direct Rule demonstrated, short of transforming the UK 
into a federal polity, when an intergovernmental conflict becomes insoluble, Westminster’s 
(legal) ability to prevail over a subordinate may confer supremacy but it cannot automatically 
ensure its legitimacy among the populace. Rather, it can sow the seeds of discontent that may 
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lead to the ultimate fragmentation of the very Union that the devolution was purported to 
strengthen. 
Table 3: Levels of Governance and Institutional Arrangements 
Tier/Level Geographic Space Typical Institution 
International 
(Supranational/ 
Intergovernmental) 
Europe European Union 
Bi-National 
(Intergovernmental) 
British Isles British-Irish Council (‘Council of the Isles’) 
British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference 
(replaces Anglo-Irish Agreement) 
Extra-National 
(Intergovernmental) 
Northern Ireland/ 
Republic of Ireland 
North-South Ministerial Council 
National United Kingdom/ 
Republic of Ireland 
Westminster/Oireachtas 
Regional Northern Ireland Northern Ireland Assembly 
Sub-Regional County/Other Area Boards (e.g., Health & Social Services 
Boards; Education & Library Boards) 
Local District/City/Borough Local Authorities (e.g., Belfast City Council) 
Sub-Local Parish/Community/ 
Locality 
Parish/Community Councils/Local 
Partnerships (e.g. North Belfast Partnership 
Board) 
  
 
Devolution – a contribution to ‘peace and stability’? 
 
An important consideration is what contribution (if any) have the devolved arrangements 
made to the creation and maintenance of peace and stability, the British Government’s stated 
intentions for Northern Ireland. Aside from the Northern Ireland Assembly being a visible 
manifestation of the implementation of the Belfast Agreement, what were the expectations for 
devolved government and to what extent have these been fulfilled? The transfer of power was 
devolved to the Assembly and its executive committee of ministers in December 1999. In the 
autumn of 2000, a survey of the population
1
 was asked whether devolution would help secure 
peace in Northern Ireland. Overall, some 40% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed 
that devolution would help secure peace in Northern Ireland and 24% disagreed or strongly 
disagreed. The results, disaggregated by religion are shown in Table 4 below. 
                                                          
1
 The results are derived from the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey which is a probability survey of 1,800 
adults (18 and over) carried via face-to-face interviews to monitor the attitudes and behaviour of the people of 
Northern Ireland on a range of issues (education, political attributes, health issues, community relations and 
social networks). 
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Table 4: Devolution will help secure peace (by religion)
2
 
 Catholic % Protestant % No religion % 
Agree and strongly agree 61 31 28 
Neither 31 39 35 
Disagree and strongly disagree 8 30 37 
 
The data suggest that there was an initial optimism about the prospects of devolution helping 
to secure peace. It is also clear that the data from Catholics were much more sanguine than 
Protestants. Interestingly, when asked in the same survey, what was the most important day-
to-day issue for the Assembly to deal with, almost 50% of respondents considered ‘the 
continuing violence’ as the principal concern for Members of the Legislative Assembly. This, 
despite the fact that policing, security policy and criminal justice are amongst the excepted 
and reserved matters for which the Northern Ireland Secretary has direct responsibility. 
 
Table 5: What has the Assembly achieved (by religion)
3
 
 Catholic % Protestant % No religion % 
A lot 37 18 29 
A little 52 56 51 
Nothing at all 11 26 20 
 
 
Some two years later with the Assembly suspended for the fourth time (in October 2002), 
public attitudes on the contribution of the Assembly were sought
4
. When asked what the 
Assembly had achieved, overall 27% of respondents claimed that it had achieved ‘a lot’, 54% 
said ‘a little’ and 19% ‘nothing at all’. Table 5 shows these data disaggregated further by 
religion. Again, Catholics were more positive about the achievements of the Assembly than 
Protestants. Taking tables 4 and 5 together would suggest that devolution as manifest through 
the Assembly has had limited success in its contribution to securing peace, with significant 
difference of opinion between the two main religious blocs. 
 
                                                          
2
 Data exclude ‘can’t choose’ and ‘missing’ categories. 
3
 Data exclude ‘don’t know’ category. 
4
 Data cited is drawn from the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey 2002. 
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Assessing the Impact of the ‘Peace Process’ and Devolution on Governance 
 
The impact of the ‘peace process’ and subsequent devolution can be assessed by reference to 
several different levels: central (provincial) government and the civil service; the North-South 
dimension; sub-regional governance (local government and quangos); community governance 
and civic partnerships; and, the European dimension. Each is considered in turn. 
 
Central (Provincial) Government in Northern Ireland and the Civil Service 
Predictably, the intermittent nature of devolution has plagued attempts to forge ahead with any 
semblance of a new, distinct policy agenda for Northern Ireland. While the new administration 
produced its Programme for Government (Executive, 2001), it has been remarkable how little 
divergence there has been from past practice “given the mantra of devolved ministers that they 
were out to ‘make a difference’ as compared with direct rule”34. Wilford and Wilson observed 
The document said 71% of actions identified in the programme – which, though 
annually iterated has had a three-year rolling timescale – had been achieved, or 
‘substantially’ achieved or, at least, were ‘on track’. Otherwise, the report is marked by 
continuity rather than change
35
. 
Wilford and Wilson attributed this to 
weak policy capacity at Stormont (concentrated in a tiny Economic Policy Unit in the 
OFMDFM), the crowding out of policy innovation by Northern Ireland’s mistrustful 
audit culture and the virtual absence of any significant policy input from parties with 
no reliable positioning on any left-right governance spectrum
36
. 
They concluded: 
The lurking paradox is that if the package of legislative and policy reforms proves to 
be welcome then direct rule may become less objectionable, particularly among 
unionists. As one advisor to Mr Trimble put it, albeit privately and somewhat 
rhetorically, ‘What’s the difference between direct rule and devolution? Direct rule is 
popular!’37. 
 
Apart from UK Departments of State that dealt with ‘reserved’ and ‘excepted’ matters, and 
whose staff belonged to the ‘Imperial’ or Home Civil Service (UKCS), civil administration 
within Northern Ireland (as in all of Ireland before Partition) has always rested with a wholly 
separate Civil Service – the Northern Ireland Civil Service (NICS)38. Thus, under devolution, 
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Direct Rule and now devolution-plus, NICS has continued as a “unique example of a regional 
civil service within the UK completely separate from the UK Civil Service”39. The network of 
government within Northern Ireland formed a territorial policy community, broadly though 
not fully congruent with Scottish and Welsh arrangements
40
. NICS has never been directly 
comparable with the home civil service as it had different functional responsibilities although 
it has traditionally followed UKCS precepts on appointment and promotion.  
 
Throughout Direct Rule, there was an enhanced role for the bureaucracy in containing the 
Northern Ireland conflict. For Morrow: 
the emphasis on administration as opposed to representation has increased the scope 
for civil service influence over policy. Given the small size of Northern Ireland, the 
result has been a tight and intimate policy network dominated by administrative 
interests. The inability of local parties to influence policy has not, however, abolished 
the need of the government to stay in contact with the governed. As a result, the civil 
service has increasingly developed its own extensive and direct relationship with 
numerous groups and agencies
41
. 
By the 1990s, the triumph of technocracy appeared irrefutable. Despite protests that theirs was 
an unwanted power, the fact remains that the senior civil service enjoyed disproportionate 
influence over the development, formulation and implementation of public policy in Northern 
Ireland (through, for example, the Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC); the PCC has since 
been replaced by a civil service management board). As Wilford and Wilson have remarked, 
the technocratic tenor of government has remained evident
42
. 
 
Irrespective of its departmental configuration, the NICS has continued to serve its political 
masters, regardless of the constitutional status and prevailing governmental arrangements of 
Northern Ireland. While society has been disfigured and corrupted by inter-communal 
sectarian violence, everyday public administration has continued to function and maintain 
public services. Under the long period of one party rule at Stormont, there is some evidence to 
suggest that the ethos of the NICS became tainted by the realities of its operational 
environment
43
. That is, the merit principle fell victim to an implicit (if not explicit) policy that 
discouraged the advancement of women (especially when married) and the appointment and 
promotion of Catholics to senior positions. No Catholic was appointed as a permanent 
secretary until the 1960s (contrasting with much higher levels of Catholic participation in the 
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‘Imperial’ Civil Service). Thereafter, payroll demographics ensured that historic under-
representation of Catholics and women would endure until corrective steps on appointments 
and promotion could begin impacting on the gender and religious complexion of the senior 
echelons of the NICS. By the late 1990s, in large measure due to a Fair Employment Agency 
investigation and subsequent creation of an Equal Opportunities Unit within NICS, religious 
imbalances had been largely eliminated leaving gender as the most glaring discrepancy, as 
outlined in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Trends in Overall Composition of the NICS by gender and religion (by %) 
 Male Female Protestant Catholic 
1987 59.8 40.2 62.5 37.5 
1989 59.0 41.0 61.6 38.4 
1991 57.7 42.3 61.2 38.8 
1993 56.6 43.4 60.4 39.6 
1995 55.3 44.7 59.7 40.3 
1997 53.4 46.6 59.3 40.7 
1999 52.0 48.0 58.6 41.4 
2002 50.8 49.2 56.0 44.0 
 
Note: Figures for Protestant and Catholic are adjusted to reflect the proportion of staff 
recorded as ‘non-declared’ or ‘non-denomination’. In 1987, the ND category was 11% 
of all NICS staff; in 2002, the corresponding figure was 3.5% 
 
Source: Equal Opportunities Unit, Department of Finance and Personnel, Northern 
Ireland Government. 
 
As well as its internal arrangements for ensuring equality in its staffing, Government has 
moved to augment Northern Ireland’s extensive fair employment legislation with measures 
designed to ‘mainstream’ equality provisions thereby ensuring that it satisfies equality 
considerations. In 1990, Policy Appraisal and Fair Treatment (PAFT) required that equality 
considerations be inserted into the policy-making process. PAFT was joined in 1991 by a 
second initiative, Targeting Social Need, designed to narrow the disparities between relative 
poverty levels within the two communities. Following the Belfast Agreement, both measures 
were subsumed by section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act, 1998. Legislation greatly extended 
the equality agenda to encompass multiple categories (religion and political opinion; gender, 
race and ethnicity, age, disability, marital status, sexual orientation, and those with 
dependants) along with the creation of a new Equality Commission subsuming all the 
previous statutory equality agencies
44
. 
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The North-South Dimension 
Unionists have long complained about a growing (albeit exaggerated) participation by Irish 
Civil Servants in the internal affairs of Northern Ireland following the Anglo-Irish Agreement. 
Ironically, forging closer relations with their southern counterparts proved easier during Direct 
Rule than during either the previous Stormont era or, indeed, since the intermittent restoration 
of devolution in 1999. The motivation for such developments is both political and pragmatic. 
The realisation that resolving Northern Ireland’s problems demanded more than an ‘internal’ 
solution as well as the not illegitimate contention that Dublin ‘spoke for’ minority nationalist 
sentiment in the North, prompted the UK Government to warm towards the Republic’s 
Government. Relations were more cordial thanks to the shared membership of, and - on 
Northern Ireland at least - a shared agenda within, the EC/EU, along with enhanced levels of 
cross-border security co-operation
45
.  
 
Interestingly, even in the period of suspended devolution, north-south bodies have operated on 
a “care and maintenance” basis, with the role of the Northern Ireland Executive being filled by 
the Direct Rule administration
46
. Thus, despite a widespread assumption that 
the lifespan of the implementation bodies would be seriously compromised by a long 
suspension, the bodies have thus been able to survive and continue their work. Indeed, 
decisions have been made in quite significant areas (including important appointments, 
policy matters and budgetary approval) on the basis of agreement between the relevant 
minister in Dublin and his or her counterpart in the British administration in Belfast
47
. 
 
Perhaps this foreshadows the shape of things to come – creeping bi-governmentalism, albeit 
falling short of the joint-sovereignty speculated upon by some pundits. Coakley argued that it 
does provide a new momentum for the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference. He noted 
that the Agreement gives Dublin a voice in non-devolved matters – effectively, a considerable 
say in Northern Ireland’s ‘internal affairs’, and a widening one during periods of suspension. 
Coakley concluded that the impact of suspension in Strands 2 and 3 has been less pronounced 
for while the Agreement said the Northern Ireland Assembly and North-South Ministerial 
Council were mutually inter-dependent, and that “one cannot function successfully without 
the other”, the Council and its associated bodies have continued operating, while, similarly, so 
have the British-Irish bodies (p.26). 
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Sub-regional governance (local government and quangos) 
Ordinarily, a system of elected local government might have afforded some opportunity for 
bypassing Northern Ireland’s constitutional imbroglio. However, once again, it was a quirk of 
history that ensured that the ‘permanent impermanence’ of Direct Rule effectively embargoed 
any meaningful progress on promoting peace, reconciliation and stability via local government 
until the late 1980s
48
. In any jurisdiction, the role of any (devolved) regional government is 
inextricably bound up with the fate of local government but especially so in Northern Ireland. 
Heated disputes over aspects of local authority behaviour had plunged the Province into the 
very civil unrest that brought Stormont into disrepute and that led, ultimately, to its demise. 
 
The ensuing removal of functions from elected local authorities and suspension of Stormont 
required vesting responsibilities with other bodies - with quangos. Since 1970, quangos have 
been the mainstay of Northern Ireland’s governmental architecture. Ordinarily, as Kingdom 
observed, quangos “offer governments some extremely useful facilities, enabling them to 
wash their hands of embarrassing matters, disclaim responsibility for unpopular policies, 
evade parliamentary scrutiny and keeps areas off the political agenda”49. Certainly, as a tool 
for administering and delivering public services, quangos have proved valuable in the 
quagmire of Northern Ireland’s sectarian divisions. Indeed, in terms of consumer satisfaction, 
impartiality and delivery, the performance of many quangos excels the rather lacklustre and 
often shameful record of former local authorities. Nonetheless, while being an understandable 
administrative device in the exacting conditions of Northern Ireland, as Skelcher remarked, 
the democratic deficit that quangos create “reflects a fundamental weakness in the ability of 
citizens to be involved in the structures with which society governs itself”50. As the 
Executive’s Programme for Government (2001) signalled: 
We have inherited from the last 30 years a wide range of public bodies. Their 
organisation and structure reflected the needs of those times. They helped maintain 
services at a time of very limited public accountability. But now that devolution has 
been achieved, there is a need for change that will provide not only greater 
accountability, but should ensure that organisations that deliver many key services 
throughout Northern Ireland are more coherently organised. It is therefore important 
that we set about a major process of reform in central government (para. 7.1.1). 
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Reconnecting citizens and those in government has been a recurrent theme across western 
democracies in recent years. For Northern Ireland, while devolution represents a decisive 
attempt to end such an estrangement, it is only the first of several necessary steps. Moreover, 
despite their creditable showing, as a device for political management, many quangos may 
well have outlived their usefulness in Northern Ireland. Denuded of the harsh realities of 
decision-making, local politicians have been able to snipe from the sidelines and indulge the 
luxury of opposition, free of the burdens of office
51
. As well as the trappings, devolution 
invests them with the burdens – and unenviable obligations – of office, to make the difficult 
choices within finite budgets, that previously rested with Direct Rule ministers. 
 
Devolution also signalled a green light for significant reform of public administration. Having 
been in place for over thirty years, the current system – itself the result of partial 
implementation of an earlier reorganisation – is long overdue for change. Questions of 
legitimacy and accountability are accompanied by concern over the efficiency and quality of 
services given the plethora of bodies that exists. Simply, Northern Ireland is ‘over-governed’ – 
or at the least, over-administered
52
. Not surprisingly, there have been repeated calls for 
streamlining. Consequently, a major examination of the system of public administration has 
been underway since mid-June 2002. 
 
The origins of the Review of Public Administration (RPA) in Northern Ireland are to be found 
in the Programme for Government in which the Northern Ireland Executive pledged from the 
outset to “lead the most effective and accountable form of government in Northern Ireland” 
(Executive, 2001). The Executive inherited a system of non-departmental public bodies 
responsible for major functions such as education, health and housing which together 
consumed two thirds of their devolved budget. Its terms of reference are: “to review the 
existing arrangements for the accountability, administration and delivery of public services in 
Northern Ireland, and to bring forward options for reform which are consistent with the 
arrangements and principles of the Belfast Agreement, within an appropriate framework of 
political and financial accountability”.  
 
Despite the present suspension of the devolved arrangements, Direct Rule ministers have 
permitted the work of the Review Team to continue, in the hope if not expectation that, once 
devolution is restored, the momentum of reform can be maintained. 
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Community governance and civic partnerships 
Throughout the Direct Rule period, the failure to secure a viable devolved settlement 
encouraged ministers to engage with other social partners as means of seeking to legitimise 
policy making in any environment devoid of an elected regional government. Partly, the 
logjam on political developments at the macro level encouraged individuals who might 
otherwise ordinarily be interested in party politics to organise and engage with non-political 
bodies such as community and voluntary groups. Over time, Northern Ireland has acquired an 
impressive array of such groups, far in excess of comparably sized regions elsewhere – some 
4500-5000 voluntary organisations alone. The richness and diversity of this ‘third’ sector (that 
is, neither public nor private) prompted government to develop partnership arrangements in 
the hope of increasingly popular participation in the policy process as well as encouraging 
cross-community cooperation on (the very wide) areas of common concern as a means of 
overcoming (or by-passing) the wide party-political divisions.  
 
Starting in earnest during the 1990s, partnership arrangements were encouraged by ministers 
in local government. Contiguous with each local council area, district partnerships brought 
together elected representatives from the constituent local authority, members of statutory 
boards (these provide inter alia health, education, housing), and representatives from the 
‘social partners’ (community and voluntary groups, businesses, trades unions and churches). 
These partnerships proved instrumental in the formulation of local priorities relatively free 
(though not completely) from the otherwise more fractious environs of many council 
chambers, as well as the disbursement of monies associated with the European Commission’s 
(Delors) Programme for Peace and Reconciliation. Such local compacts in Northern Ireland 
had not, hitherto, been replicated elsewhere in the UK
53
.  
 
The transition from Direct Rule to devolution has heralded a reinforcement of the trend. In its 
Programme for Government, the Executive stated its vision: 
Regeneration of our society – in the fullest sense means that we have to tackle issues 
of equality and human rights, poverty and social disadvantage, renewal of the most 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods, sustaining and enhancing local communities and 
improving cross community relations. … In tackling these issues we have the 
advantage of a vibrant and extensive community and voluntary sector which already 
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makes significant and critical contributions to many areas of life. A key challenge will 
be to build on this community capacity and to involve it in policies and programmes 
aimed at strengthening our community well being (Executive, 2001, para.2.1.1). 
Osborne and McLaughlin conclude that local compacts have “the potential to give substance 
to the rhetoric of community governance, by providing explicit processes for the community 
to impact upon policy formulation and service management at local level”54. 
 
The European Dimension 
The idea of ‘Europe’ and the unfolding process of European integration through the medium 
of the European Union serve as an umbrella under which the recurrent tensions within 
Northern Ireland have been outplayed. While the EU offered its services in brokering a deal 
within Northern Ireland, the reality has been that only its goodwill and, more tangibly, its 
largesse, have played a direct part. Nevertheless, the implicit impact of the wider European 
(and indeed global) dimension has fostered a changing environment wherein negotiations 
were conducted and to which, perhaps subliminally, the actors were responding. Much of that 
impact is perhaps symbolic, even abstract, but is no less relevant for all that, in the land where 
flags, emblems and the associated atavistic trappings of tribalism are so potent.  
 
For some commentators, the Belfast Agreement typifies a new post-nationalist era when both 
Unionists and Nationalists are reviewing critically ideas of nation, state and identity
55
. Put 
simply, it was hoped that the emergence of a shared European identity might transcend and 
render obsolete ancient enmities. Despite an enlarging European Union of regions with fast-
disappearing internal borders, constitutional disputes of the type that beset Northern Ireland 
continue and so this main goal has not been achieved thus far. 
 
Nonetheless, the influence of the European dimension has the potential to work in different 
ways and at different levels. Formally, the EU has no direct role in Northern Ireland – EU 
business is the competence of the relevant Member State (i.e. the UK Government). 
Nonetheless, with both the UK and the Irish Governments having acceded concurrently, the 
EU provides an additional forum in which diplomatic links can be created and differences 
settled. Additionally, all three MEPs from Northern Ireland have assiduously exploited 
available EU resources for the betterment of life in the Province (Northern Ireland retained its 
‘Objective 1’ status long after its automatic entitlement had ceased). They were instrumental 
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in securing the (‘Delors’) Programme for Peace and Reconciliation Programme of 500M Euro 
to help bolster the peace process and promote reconciliation. Moreover, even before 
devolution, like other regions in the UK and across the EU, Northern Ireland had established a 
more permanent representation in Brussels, seeking to promote itself as a “forward and 
outward-looking region” (Executive, 2001). The House of Lords considered the devolved 
administrations in the UK to be better placed than counterparts elsewhere
56
. The move was a 
pragmatic recognition not only of the shifting locus of power from nation-state to the 
supranational level, but desirous also of continuing to accrue the benefits that EU membership 
has yielded for a traditional relatively deprived part of the EU such as Northern Ireland. 
 
Conclusions 
 
For too long, political discourse in Northern Ireland has been characterised by a zero sum 
game form of analysis wherein gains for one side must imply corresponding offsetting losses 
by the other. However, the problems that confront the community as a whole in Northern 
Ireland frequently go far beyond narrow and exclusive cultural, religious or national identities. 
Longer-term stability warrants institutions of government (broadly defined) that can 
effectively deliver the range of public policy outcomes desired by citizens irrespective of 
background or affinitive ideology. Either/or ‘solutions’  - full integration, full reunification, or 
majoritarian devolution seem destined to fail since none can ever command the sufficiency of 
cross community consent required for it to enjoy popular legitimacy and authority. 
Superficially, at the heart of the Belfast Agreement is an antinomy – Unionists (and anti-
Agreement Republicans) contend that it maintains the Union by copper-fastening Partition 
while Nationalists/Republicans (and anti-Agreement Unionists) contend that it loosens the 
Union and advances the cause of Irish reunification. Clearly, when couched in such stark 
terms, these diametrically opposed conclusions cannot be simultaneously correct. However, 
this is precisely why the Belfast Agreement was designed to transcend such categorical black 
and white analysis by recognising ‘the totality of relationships in these islands’. Mutual 
recognition and accommodation rather than transformation of national and cultural identities 
is the order of the day. Though operationalising it has proved excruciatingly slow leaving a 
present settlement that is far from perfect, the Agreement – renegotiated, revised, reconfigured 
or not  - appears to offer the only credible basis for lasting stability. 
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While there are serious misgivings, especially among Unionists, about devolution, these tend 
to concern its operationalisation, rather its intrinsic conceptual attractions. The stated 
positions of the various political parties appear to be out of kilter with the general feeling 
among the public. Overall, 43% of people in Northern Ireland support devolution, as 
compared with only 21% supporting a united Ireland, and fewer still (13%) direct rule or 
independence (10%). Support for the Union has fallen during recent years, though there has 
not been concomitant growth in commitment to the ideal of a ‘united Ireland’. Rather, “the 
emphasis on either-or constitutional choices by Northern Ireland’s politicians misread the 
public mood”57. In all probability, with the joint guarantors of London and Dublin, any 
enduring settlement for Northern Ireland will involve a form of governance at the heart of 
which will be a lasting commitment to a sharing of power – and identities - of all sections of 
the resident population. 
  
Devolution and the associated mechanisms of governance - a power-sharing Executive, 
elected Assembly, cross-border bodies, a reformed system of public administration and civic 
engagement, are part of the wider mosaic of peace building. Their implementation is an 
attempt to institutionalise stability and copper-fasten a political settlement. Despite the 
insidious and ongoing paramilitary violence, devolved government and reformed local 
governance arrangements (not simply because of their popular appeal) build-in a degree of 
electoral accountability which reaffirms the wider desire for long-term stability and peace co-
existence, albeit with different long-term political aspirations. 
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